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Case Comments
Constitutional Law: Sales Tax on Fuel for Ships'
Stores Valid Under Import-Export Clause
Shell Oil Company sued for refund of a state sales tax1 on
fuel oil to be consumed by vessels engaged in interstate and
foreign commerce.2  The trial court held the tax valid in its
entirety. The district court of appeal upheld the tax on fuel
for use in interstate commerce, but, relying upon the import-
export clause of the Constitution,3 invalidated the tax on fuel
consumed in foreign commerce. The California Supreme Court
vacated the opinion of the district court of appeals and affirmed
the trial court decision. Shell Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 64 Cal. 2d 772, 414 P.2d 820 (1966).
The United States Constitution forbids both state4 and fed-
eral5 taxation of exports. The denial of federal power to tax
exports resulted from Southern suspicion that, unless the fed-
eral government was restricted in taxing exports, the North
would use its numerical advantage to enact taxes which would
discriminate against Southern exports.6 The prohibition of
state taxation of exports stemmed from the fear of the inland
states that tax burdens would be imposed upon outgoing goods
by the coastal states.7
1. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 6051, 6052. Section 6051 provides:
'For the privilege of selling tangible personal property at retail a
tax is hereby imposed upon all retailers at the rate of 2 percent of
the gross receipts ... "
2. The parties stipulated that the fuel in question was indispen-
sable to the voyage and actually consumed during the voyage. The
vessels receiving the fuel fell into three cateogries: (1) vessels reg-
istered in foreign countries and engaged in foreign commerce; (2) ves-
sels registered in the United States and engaged in foreign commerce;
and, (3) vessels registered in the United States and engaged in inter-
state commerce.
3. "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be abso-
lutely necessary for executing its inspection laws .... ." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
4. Ibid.
5. "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any
State." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
6. See 2 FARRAND, TaE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CoNvENTIoN 305
(1911).
7. Madison aptly stated the point of view of the inland states in
a debate over adoption of the prohibitions on export taxation: "The
states whose produce is exported by other states, were extremely jeal-
ous, lest a contribution should be raised of them by the exporting states,
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The problem encountered most frequently in interpreting and
applying the constitutional prohibition of state taxation of ex-
ports is the determination of when articles destined for foreign
countries may be taxed. Generally, goods are considered to be
part of the general mass of property in a state and subject to its
power of taxation until they have started upon a continuous
route or journey to a foreign country.8 For example, Cornell v.
Coyne9 sustained a nondiscriminatory tax on the process of manu-
facturing an article intended for export because the export proc-
ess had not begun. An article not yet in the export process is
not protected from state taxation even though, in due course, the
plan to export the item will be carried out.10 However, in
A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards" a sales tax was nullified
because the sale was considered the initial step in the export
process.' 2  Thus the cases establish that when the goods have
commenced their movement abroad and "certainty of foreign
destination is plain,"' 3 the export process is under way and the
goods may not be taxed.
In the instant case, this test was inapplicable because both
lower courts and the supreme court agreed that fuel oil for
ships' consumption is not an export. The United States Supreme
Court has consistently held that for goods to be "exports" must
not only be removed from the United States but must be de-
livered to a foreign country. 4 Thus goods to be consumed dur-
by laying heavy duties on their commodities." 3 FARRAND, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 328.
8. Empresa Siderurgica, S.A. v. County of Merced, 337 U.S. 154
(1949); Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69
(1946).
9. 192 U.S. 418 (1904). Although this case deals with the federal
prohibition on taxation of exports, the court stated that the state pro-
hibition on taxation of exports was "substantially the same." Id. at 427.
See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445-46 (1827).
. 10. Empresa Siderurgica, S.A. v. County of Merced, 337 U.S. 154
(1949): The Court held that a personal property tax on the portion of
a cement plant which had not actually been shipped did not violate the
import-export clause although the cement plant had been sold to a for-
eign purchaser for shipment to his country.
11. 262 U.S.'66 (1923).
12. The very act that passed the title and that would have
incurred the tax had the transaction been domestic, committed
the goods to the carrier that was to take them across the sea,
for the purpose of export and with the direction to the foreign
port upon the goods. The expected and accomplished effect of
the act was to start them for that port. Id. at 69.
13. Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 82-
83.(1946). See also Gough Indus., Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 51
Cal. 2d 746, 748-49, 336 P.2d 161, 162-63, cert denied, 359 U.S. 1011 (1959).14. See, e.g., Swan & Finch Co. v. United States, 190 U.S. 143, 144-
45 (1903). In Swan the Court stated that export cannot mean simply
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ing the voyage of a vessel bound for a foreign destination are
not exports.'r
The California courts found the issue presented to be wheth-
er the tax on the fuel to propel the export cargo is the
equivalent of a tax on the cargo. The Supreme Court has held
that the import-export clause involves more than immunity from
a direct tax on the exported goods.16 The tax immunity includes
"the process of exportation and the transactions and documents
embraced in it."' 7 A stamp tax on foreign bills of lading was
struck down as the equivalent of a tax on the articles. 8 A stamp
tax on insurance policies covering exports 9 and a stamp tax on
charter parties in foreign commerce have also been held uncon-
stitutional.
20
In Canton R.R. v. Rogan2 ' the circle of immunity for indirect
taxes on exports was limited. The Court reaffirmed the princi-
ple that a tax may be unconstitutional as the "equivalent of a
a carrying out of the country because goods transported from one Cal-
ifornia city to another by sea would then be considered exports. Fur-
ther, export cannot be defined as goods which will not return to the
country since fuel used in transit between one California city to another
would then be considered an export. Id. at 145.
15. See Id. at 144-45; West India Oil Co. v. Sancho, 108 F.2d 144,
147 (1st Cir. 1939), a-fd sub. nom., West India Oil Co. v. Domenech, 311
U.S. 20 (1940); Matson Navigation Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 136
Cal. App. 2d 577, 289 P.2d 73 (1955).
Shell Oil Company argued that ships of foreign registry are foreign
territory and consequently the fuel oil constituted an export. Both the
district court and supreme court rejected this argument as a fiction and
regarded the distinction between ships of foreign registry and American
ships engaged in foreign commerce as immaterial. As a policy matter
similar treatment seems necessary. American ships would be at a severe
disadvantage if the fuel supply of foreign ships was exempt from taxa-
tion but their own supply taxable.
16. See Empresa Siderurgica, S.A. v. County of Merced, 337 U.S.
154, 156-57 (1949); Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S.
19 (1915); United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1 (1915); Fairbank v.
United States, 181 U.S. 283 (1901).
17. Empresa Siderurgica, S.A. v. County of Merced, supra note 16,
at 156.
18. Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283 (1901). Although the
tax was a nominal ten cents on each bill of lading, the court argued the
amount of the burden is immaterial because the constitutional provision
provides for no tax or duty. Id. at 291.
19. Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19 (1915).
20. United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1 (1915). Fairbank, Thames
& Mersey and Hvoslef involved article I, section 9, clause 5 which is
applicable only to the federal government. However, it is established
that the same standards apply to the limitation on state power to tax
found in article I, section 10, clause 2. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 419, 445-46 (1827).
21. 340 U.S. 511 (1951).
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direct tax on the articles,"22 but sustained a franchise tax as
applied to the income of a railroad engaged solely in the trans-
portation of goods intended for export.23  Admitting a broad
scope of immunity for exports themselves, 24 the Court held that
"when the tax is on activities connected with the export or
import the range of immunity cannot be so wide"25 but must
"begin and end at the water's edge."26 The Court did not decide
whether loading for export and unloading for import are immune
from taxation 27 but held any activity more remote than loading
and unloading not within the constitutional prohibition.28
In the instant case the California Supreme Court excluded
the sale of fuel oil for ships' consumption from the scope of the
prohibition of indirect taxes on exports.29 The court refused to
follow the broad language contained in the decisions recognizing
the immunity of insurance,30 bills of lading,31 and charter par-
ties3 2 which would seem to grant immunity to any process or
service necessary for exportation. Since such language encom-
22. Id. at 513.
23. Mr. Justice Jackson, whom Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined,
reserved judgment arguing that the constitutional policy of affording
inland farms and factories a fair access to the sea unburdened by taxes
levied by coastal states may be frustrated by sustaining a tax upon an
incident "unavoidable in the process of exportation." Id. at 516-17.
24. Id. at 514. See, e.g., Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equal-
ization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946); A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S.
66 (1923).
25. Canton R.R. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511, 515 (1951).
26. Ibid. See Mohegan Int'l Corp. v. City of New York, 17 Misc. 2d
104, 184 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Sup. Ct. 1959). The Canton Court stated that a
broader definition of the constitutional protection would "lead back to
every forest, mine, and factory in the land and create a zone of tax
immunity never before imagined." 340 U.S. at 515. See Western Md.
Ry. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 520 (1951). The Court's belief that the restric-
tion of the immunity imposed in Canton was necessary to retain the
constitutional protection within reasonable bounds seems unjustified.
The standard of immunity applied to exports could be applied to the
export process also. The application of this test to the activities con-
nected with export would not lead back to every forest, mine, and fac-
tory in the land. The range of immunity created thereby would not
seem unreasonably broad.
27. 340 U.S. at 515. Under the interstate commerce clause, steve-
doring services have been held immune from a state tax on gross re-
ceipts. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947);
Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937).
28. 340 U.S. at 515.
29. The same issue was raised in McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309
U.S. 414 (1940), but the Court refused to rule on it because the point
was not raised on appeal. Id. at 429.
30. Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19 (1915).
31. Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283 (1901).
32. United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1 (1915).
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passes processes and services previously held taxable,3 3 the court
was undoubtedly correct.
However, this argument is hardly determinative. These cases,
restricted to their facts, seem persuasive authority for finding
the tax on the fuel oil invalid.34 The court attempted to dis-
tinguish these cases by arguing that while there is a close rela-
tionship between the volume or value of the articles of export
and the amount of the tax on the insurance, bills of lading, and
charter parties, the amount of the sales tax on the oil does not
vary according to the volume or value of exported goods. This
distinction appears unjustified since the invalidated tax on bills
of lading was the same for every bill of lading regardless of the
value or volume of the goods covered.35 A further distinction
apparently made by the court was that fuel used to transport
export goods is a "distinct or separable subject. '36 This distinc-
tion has some validity. While the documents held immune from
taxation are symbolic of the goods being exported, fuel oil does
not possess this symbolic relationship. However, in another
sense, fuel is not distinct or separable. Fuel is absolutely neces-
sary for the voyage, but the documents, although commonly
used, are not indispensable.
While relying generally upon Canton R.R. v. Rogan,37 the
California Supreme Court made no reference to the clear impli-
cation of Canton that activities of export occurring at or beyond
the water's edge are immune from taxation.3 Apparently the
court believed the water's edge test met by the argument that
the tax was on the sale of the oil, not on the voyage. However,
in export cases courts have traditionally looked to the effect of
33. E.g., Canton R.R. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511 (1951) (transportation
of exports to port); Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418 (1904) (manufac-
turing process).
34. It should be noted that the district court of appeals also con-
cluded that the language was too broad but found the tax invalid.
35. Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448 § 6, 30 Stat. 448.
36. 414 P.2d at 827. See Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v. United
States, 237 U.S. 19, 27 (1915).
37. 340 U.S. 511 (1951).
38. Id. at 515. It should be noted that the water's edge test is not
free from criticism. Mr. Justice Jackson, joined by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, reserving judgment, argued that "if the constitutional policy can
be avoided by shifting the tax from the exported article itself to some
incident such as carriage, unavoidable in the process of exportation,
then the policy is a practical nullity." Id. at 517.
The district court in Shell Oil stated that the spatial concept of giv-
ing immunity "at the water's edge" is too rigid a standard to follow. 46
Cal. Rptr. 653, 657-58 (1965).
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the tax on exportation rather than to the incidence of the tax.89
Thus in the instant case the court should have judged the sales
tax, not by the location of the local incident of taxation, but by
the location of the effect of the tax in the export process. Under
the Canton analysis, if the burden of the tax falls on a part of
the export occurring beyond the water's edge, the tax should be
invalid.40 Even accepting the court's argument that the tax be
judged by the place of the local incident, it is arguable that the
delivery of the fuel oil to the fuel tanks of the vessel was "the
incident which gave rise to the. . . tax. ... -41
The strong reliance of the California court upon the inci-
dence of the tax is consonant with many references throughout
the Shell Oil opinion to commerce clause principles. 42 Under the
commerce clause, the purchase of supplies for use in interstate
business "is not so identified with that commerce as to make the
sale immune from a nondiscriminatory tax imposed by the State
upon intrastate dealers. ' '43 However, the commerce clause is not
coterminous with the import-export clause.44 Because the com-
merce clause is a grant of power to Congress rather than a pro-
hibition of state taxation, 45 the courts, in applying the clause,
have been free to balance local and national interests. The im-
port-export clause, on the other hand, is an express denial of
state power to tax, admitting no exceptions, and allowing the
courts no discretion to balance the interests affected. 4 6 The im-
39. In Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69
(1946), the Court found a tax on the sale of oil destined for a foreign
port was a tax on exports prohibited by the import-export clause. The
Court rejected the argument that the tax was not an impost because it
was measured by the gross receipts of retail sales and levied on retail-
ers for the privilege of selling tangible personal property at retail.
In Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917), the Court
stated it was "duty bound to determine the questions raised under the
Federal Constitution upon our own judgment on the actual operation
and effect of the tax, irrespective of the form it bears or how it is char-
acterized by the state courts." Id. at 294.
40. There is some dispute whether the tax on the fuel actually re-
sults in an increase of the cost of exported goods. Appellant's Brief,
p. 20.
41. Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 84
(1946).
42. A tax falling on a local incident is valid under the commerce
clause. See American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965).
43. Eastern Air Transport v. Tax Comm'n, 285 U.S. 147, 153 (1932).
44. Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 75
(1946).
45. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422, 445
(1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).




port-export clause may invalidate a tax valid under the com-
merce clause.47
The cases interpreting the import-export clause have not
developed a consistent position on the policy considerations un-
derlying the constitutional prohibition of taxation of exports. In
the instant case the California Supreme Court made no attempt
to justify its decision on policy grounds. The historical policy
supporting the constitutional prohibition may be the prevention
of discrimination against the inland states.48 If this consideration
is controlling, it could be argued that the sales tax in Shell Oil
is discriminatory because it is levied on an event which only the
coastal states have an opportunity to tax.49
However, the Richfield Oil decision rejected discrimination
as the basis of the constitutional prohibition. The immunity of
exports from state taxation was found to be "only a phase of a
larger design"'' 0 which includes the prohibition of federal taxa-
tion. The Court held the intent of the clause was that articles of
export be free from any burden of taxation.51 Under this analy-
sis, a tax may be sustained only if it is demonstrated that the
tax would not affect the cost of exports.
There is some suggestion in Canton that no policy con-
sideration is sufficiently important to justify a broad construc-
tion of the constitutional provision. The opinion appears moti-
vated more by a desire to protect state revenue than by the need
for protection of exportation. Arguably Canton is based on
the premise that there is no longer any significant policy con-
sideration requiring the prohibition of taxation of exports.52
Although the result which the California Supreme Court
reached may be correct, the cases and arguments presented do
not seem to dictate such a result. A frank discussion of policy
considerations should have been undertaken to determine wheth-
er the import-export clause was applicable.
47. Commonwealth v. Northern Metal Co., 416 Pa. 75, 85-86, 204
A.2d 467, 473 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965).
48. Canton R.R. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511, 517 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
reserving judgment); Note, 47 COLUm. L. RaV. 490, 492 (1947).
49. However, the policy of preventing discrimination may require
only that the coastal states be prohibited from assessing taxes which dis-
criminate against exports. Such a rationale would validate the tax in
the instant case since it applies equally to all sales of oil made by Cal-
ifornia retailers and in no way discriminates against sales to vessels
engaged in the export process.
50. 329 U.S. at 76-77.
51. Id. at 76. This position is probably correct. By explicitly stating
one exception, the language of the import-export clause would appear
to exclude all other exceptions. See note 3 supra.
52. See notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text.
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Jurisdiction: Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Obtained
By Attaching Obligations Under an
Automobile Liability Policy
Plaintiffs, residents of New York, were injured in an auto-
mobile accident in Vermont allegedly caused by the negligence of
defendant, a resident of Quebec. Plaintiff sought jurisdiction
over defendant in New York by attaching the contractual obli-
gation of an insurance company, doing business in New York, to
defend and indemnify defendant. Defendant's motion to vacate
the attachment and service of sunnons and complaint was de-
nied. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that as
soon as the accident occurred, insurer's contractual obligation to
defend and indemnify defendant was an attachable debt within
the meaning of state statutes.' Seider v. Roth, 23 App. Div. 2d
787, 258 N.Y.S.2d 795, aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966).
In the absence of personal jurisdiction, courts may obtain
jurisdiction in rem2 or quasi in rem through the presence of
property within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum state.4
The forum in which the property is actually located determines
the jurisdiction over tangibles.5 However, the jurisdictional loca-
tion of intangibles 6 is often a matter of controversy.7 An ap-
praisal of the requirements of justice, convenience to the parties
involved, and efficiency of judicial administration are often sig-
nificant considerations in determining the situs of an intangible.8
1. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §§ 5201, 6202.
2. In rem designates proceedings or actions instituted against the
thing. See GOODRICH, CONFLICT or LAWS § 68 (4th ed. Scoles 1964). An
in rem proceeding is used when both parties have a legal interest in the
property itself such as partition of real estate, foreclosure of a mortgage,
or enforcement of a lien. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 715 (1877).
3. Quasi in rem is where no claim upon the thing itself is asserted
but the value of the res is sought to satisfy the claim that does exist.
See Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem To Compel Payment
of a Debt, 27 HARv. L. REV. 107 (1913).
4. Salm v. Krieg, 182 Misc. 721, 49 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1944); Beale,
supra note 3.
5. Salm v. Krieg, supra.
6. Intangible property consists of a right of one individual to have
another perform an obligation. See Simmons, Conflict of Laws and
Constitutional Law in Respect to Intangibles, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 91, 93
(1937).
7. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See gener-
ally Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in Suits Against Non-Resident Claim-
ants, 49 YALE L.J. 241 (1939).
8. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d
960 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958), 46 CALIF. L. Ray. 639 (1958);
CASE COMMENTS
One type of intangible which may be the subject matter of
quasi in rem jurisdiction is a debt.9 On the authority of Harris v.
Balk,'0 a state court can assume jurisdiction over a debt whenever
personal jurisdiction over the debtor can be obtained." Ac-
cordingly, most courts have interpreted local statutes to permit
attachment 12 of a debt created outside of the state when the
debtor is a nonresident corporation doing business within the
jurisdiction.13
Insurance policies frequently have been recognized as attach-
able debts under local statutes.14  Under such statutes most
courts require the debt to be absolutely payable at present or in
Severnoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Co., 255 N.Y. 120 (1931).
See generally CARMoDY-FoRKoscH, NEW YORK PRACTICE §§ 265-67 (8th
ed. 1963); Powell, Business Situs of Credits, 28 W. VA. L. REv. 89 (1922);
34 YALE L.J. 652, 654, 656 (1925).
9. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT or LAwS § 108 (1934); Annot., 12
A.L.R.2d 787 (1950).
10. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
11. See MmIoR, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 125 (1901). Other courts may
be able to assert jurisdiction over the debt, notably where jurisdiction
over the creditor can be asserted. See Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 2,
§ 71; Riesenfeld, Creditors' Remedies and the Conflict of Laws-Part
One: Individual Collection of Claims, 60 COLum. L. REV. 659, 670-78
(1960).
12. Attachment is the process of seizing persons or their property
which is used to bring a person before the court or to acquire jurisdic-
tion over the property seized. One species of attachment is known as
foreign attachment or garnishment. Garnishment arrests property in
the hands of a third person who may become liable to pay it over upon
determination of the main action. See GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 2,
§ 71. In the instant case, foreign attachment, which will be referred
to hereinafter as attachment, was the process used for obtaining juris-
diction.
13. See, e.g., Feinman v. Marks, 294 N.Y. 367, 62 N.E.2d 606 (1945);
Note, Jurisdiction In Rem and Quasi In Rem Upon Constructive Service
of Nonresidents, 18 MbNn. L. Ruv. 708, 715, n.21 (1934). For constitu-
tional limitations on jurisdiction, see International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Notice to defendant is necessary if the judgment is to be binding
in other states under the full faith and credit clause of the federal
constitution. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 228 (1905).
14. E.g., Brainard v. Rogers, 74 Cal. App. 247, 237 Pac. 1095 (1925)
(fire insurance); Matter of Riggle's Estate, 11 App. Div. 2d 51, 205 N.Y.S.
2d 19 (1960), ajf'd, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962) (insurance
policy was debt justifying grant of ancillary adrninstrator); Baumgold
Bros. v. Schwarzschild Bros., 276 App. Div. 158, 93 N.Y.S.2d 658, affd,
302 N.Y. 628, 97 N.E.2d 357 (1949) (burglary insurance); Kratzenstein
v. Lehman, 18 Misc. 590, 42 N.Y. Supp. 237 (1896) (life insurance). But
see Smaltz Goodwin Co. v. Poppe, Inc., 172 Minn. 43, 214 N.W. 762
(1927); cf., Lawrence v. Times Printing Co., 90 Fed. 24 (C.C. Wash.
1898) (contract does not provide basis for an action in rem). See gen-
erally Note, 18 Mnmm. L. REV. 708, 722 (1934).
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the future, and not dependent on any contingency.15 But when
the existence of an obligation is fixed and the contingency re-
lates merely to the amount or time when due and the amount
may be determined with some certainty, many courts have al-
lowed attachment. 16 Cases allowing attachment of insurance
policies appear to be based on the theory that the insurer's obli-
gation to the insured is existing and of present value.'7 New
York has recognized that an insurance policy may be a debt and
has allowed attachment of life insurance 8 and burglary in-
surance. 19
In the instant case, the major objection raised to the attach-
ment was that the obligation to defend and indemnify was a
contingent debt and therefore not attachable. The court, re-
jecting this contention, held that the insurer's contractual obli-
gation to defend and indemnify the insured in case of an accident
was a debt owing to defendant which could be validly attached.
Generally, the determination as to whether a debt is contingent
appears to depend upon the following considerations: (1) the
existence of an obligation, (2) the indefeasibility of the obliga-
tion, and (3) certainty of the value of the obligation.
As soon as an accident occurs, the insurer has an obligation to
defend within the policy coverage.20 While negligence must be
15. See, e.g., Sheehy v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 266 N.Y. 44,
193 N.E. 633 (1934) (rodeo contract payable in installments); Hermann
& Grace v. City of New York, 130 App. Div. 531, 114 N.Y. Supp. 1107
(1909), aff'd, 199 N.Y. 600, 93 N.E. 376 (1910) (value of work to be
performed); DRAKE, ATTAcmmT § 551 (7th ed. 1891); Johnson, Attach-
ment of Choses of Action in New York, 13 N.Y.U.L. REv. 371, 387-90
(1936).
16. E.g., Brainard v. Rogers, 74 Cal. App. 247, 239 Pac. 1095 (1925)
(fire insurance garnishable before proof of loss); Baumgold Bros. v.
Schwarzschild Bros., 276 App. Div. 158, 93 N.Y.S.2d 658, affd, 302 N.Y.
628, 97 N.E.2d 357 (1949) (burglary insurance attached before proof of
loss); Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Field, Merritt & Co., 45 Pa. 129,
133 (1863). If the value of an insurance policy can be determined by
a jury it may be attached. See DRAKE, op. cit. supra note 15, § 549.
17. See Brainard v. Rogers, 74 Cal. App. 247, 239 Pac. 1095 (1925);
Baumgold Bros. v. Schwarzschild Bros., 276 App. Div. 158, 93 N.Y.S.2d
658, aff'd, 302 N.Y. 628, 97 N.E.2d 357 (1949) (debt has present value
despite no present right to collection); Annot., 94 A.L.R. 1441, 1442
(1934).
18. Morgan v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 189 N.Y. 447, 82 N.E.
438 (1907); Kratzenstein v. Lehman, 13 Misc. 590, 42 N.Y. Supp. 237
(1896).
19. Baumgold Bros. v. Schwarzschild Bros., 276 App. Div. 158, 93
N.Y.S.2d 658, aff'd, 302 N.Y. 628, 97 N.E.2d 357 (1949).
20. Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 148, 77 N.E.2d
131 (1948); Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 458 (1956). See 7A APPLEWAN, INsuR-
ANCE LAw AND PRAcTIcE § 4683 (1962); Frumer, Determination of an
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proven, the insurer's obligation to pay for any liability imposed
upon the insured also exists from the time of the accident. 21
Thus, as soon as the accident occurs, an obligation sufficient to
create a debtor-creditor relationship between the insurer and
the insured exists.
Courts appear to require that a debt must be indefeasibly
fixed to be attachable.22 Underlying this position is the desire to
avoid multiplicity of lawsuits which would result from unen-
forceable judgments based on attachment of a speculative debt.23
In the instant case, the obligation to defend was indefeasibly
fixed once the accident occurred and thus was properly attach-
able. However, the obligation to indemnify was defeasible since
it was dependent on proof of negligence. Nevertheless, the ob-
jection of attachment of a defeasible debt was not persuasive in
the instant case because as soon as negligence was proven this
obligation became fixed and was no longer speculative.
In a quasi in rem proceeding, the recovery is limited to the
value of the debt -;2 4 therefore, the value of the obligation must be
determinable in order to enforce the judgment.25 However, the
pecuniary value of the obligation to defend and indemnify is
difficult to determine.26 At the time of attachment, the valuation
of the insurer's obligation to the insured is unascertainable and
will not become certain until the end of the litigation. Neverthe-
less, New York courts have allowed attachment of the insurer's
obligation in previous cases even though the value of the debt was
Insurer's Duty to Defend, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 152 (1961); Note, The Insurer's
Duty to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
734 (1966).
The existence of jurisdiction is not a condition of the insurer's
obligation to defend. See Fishman v. Sanders, 15 N.Y.2d 298, 258 N.Y.S.
2d 380 (1965) (dictum).
21. See Stonborough v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 154, 54
N.E.2d 342 (1944) (insurer's obligation under automobile policy became
fixed on happening of accident).
22. See, e.g., Sheehy v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 266 N.Y. 44,
193 N.E. 633 (1934); Hermann & Grace v. City of New York, 130 App.
Div. 531, 114 N.Y. Supp. 1107 (1909).
23. Ibid.
24. See Beale, supra note 3.
25. Brainard v. Rogers, 74 Cal. App. 247, 239 Pac. 1095 (1925);
Baumgold Bros. v. Schwarzschild Bros., 276 App. Div. 158, 93 N.Y.S.2d
658, affd, 302 N.Y. 628, 97 N.E.2d 357 (1949).
26. The question has been raised as to the amount a plaintiff could
recover if the defendant defaults. The only logical extension of the
court's position would be that if defendant defaults, admitting negli-
gence, plaintiff could recover proven damages up to the limits of the
policy. See Comment, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 5201 (Supp. 1965).
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not known at the time of attachment 27 but would be determined
in the lawsuit. For example, in Matter of Riggle's Estate,28 re-
lied on by the instant court, the plaintiff, injured in an automo-
bile accident, brought suit in New York against defendant, who
died before the lawsuit was completed. In order to continue the
lawsuit in the forum, it was necessary to appoint an ancillary
administrator who could be served in New York, which was pos-
sible only if defendant left real or personal property, in the state.
The court said that the personal obligation of an indemnity in-
surance carrier to defend'insured was a debt which could be
considered personal property The court was unconcerned with
the value of the insurer's obligation, apparently assuming that
the value would be determined by the verdict.2 9
The instant court correctly relied on Riggle in deciding that
this type of debt is not one a court should be hesitant to attach;
once the obligation exists, the fact that it is not indefeasibly
fixed and the amount is undetermined at the time of attachment
should not be significant if the lawsuit will decide both questions
and the judgment can be executed.
The defendant also raised the objection that there was no
"attachable debt" because the cause of action was not assignable.
In support of his position, the defendant cited a New York statute
providing that: "A debt 7may consist of a cause of-action which
could be assigned or transfeired. , "'30 However, *the court'did
not discuss assignability, perhaps interpreting the statutory pro-
vision as being permissive rather than mandatory.31 More sig-
27. -.See Brainard v. Rogers, 74 Cal. App. 247, 239 Pao. 1095 (1925);
Fishman v Sanders, 15 N.Y.2d 298, 258 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1965), Baumgold
Bros. v. Schwarzschild Bros., 276 App. Div, 158, 93 N.Y.S.2d 658, aff'd,
302 N.Y. 628, 97 N.E.2d 357 (1949)
28. 11 App. Div. 2d 51, 205 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1962) Even the dissent
agreed that the obligation to defend and contingently indemnify was
a debt.
29. In Riggle, while only the obligation to defend was- considered
a debt, the court appears-to assume-that the obligation to indemnify is
part of the obligation to defend. Ibzd.
30. A money judgment may be enforced, against any debt,
which is past due or which is yet to become due, certainly or
upon demand of the judgment debtor, whether it .was incurred
within or without the.state, to. or from a resideit or non-resi-
dent, unless it is exempt from application to the satisfaction of
the judgment. A debt may consist of a cause of action which
could be assigned or transferred accruing within or without the
state. (Emphasis added.)"
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 5201.
Any debt against which a money judgment may be enforced is sub-
ject to attachment. N.Y. Civ; PRAc. LAW § 6202..
31. See Brief for Plaintiffs, p. 9.
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nificantly, the decision may imply that once the accident oc-
curred the obligation to defend and indemnify was an assignable
cause of action. Traditionally, an indemnity or liability policy
has been considered a personal contract which may not be as-
signed because the insurer has undertaken a given risk.32 How-
ever, once the accident has occurred, there is no reason why the
obligation of the insurer to defend or indemnify for the risk as-
sumed may not be assigned since it is a cause of action arising
under the original contract.33
While attachment of an insurer's obligation to defend and
indemnify is a logical extension of prior cases and existing
statutes, the question remains whether such an extension of
quasi in rem jurisdiction is desirable.
Upon the rationale of the instant case, a suit may be brought
in any state in which the defendant's insurer is doing business.
Moreover, the New York court did not restrict attachment of the
insurer's obligation to situations in which the forum is conveni-
ent. However, New York appears to have had enough interest
in the instant case to make it an appropriate forum. The
plaintiffs were residents of New York, as was the co-defendant,
and medical treatment was obtained in New York. The insurance
company was doing business in New York and could easily
defend the suit in that forum. The only resulting inconvenience
would be to the defendant and witnesses who would have to
travel to New York. The two most significant interests appear to
be the resident plaintiff and the amenable insurance company.
Although the doctrine of forum non" conveniens places some
limitations on forum shopping, it may not be adequate to prevent
abuse of this extension of attachment. Not all states recognize
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and most states are reluc-
tant to apply the doctrine to actions which are quasi -in rem.34
Another problem in'allowing attachment is that if' as in New
32. See, e.g., Tyrnauer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 293,
223 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1961), af-d, 13 N.Y.2d 613, 240 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1963);
Kolb v. Brummer, 185 App. Div. 835, 173 N.Y. Supp. 72 (1918), afrd, 226
N.Y. 570, 123 N.E. 858 (1919).
33. See 30 N.Y. Jun. 243. Some limitation may be placed on as-
signability of insurance claim to third parties not involved in the acci-
dent but there appears to be no reason why the claim could not be
assigned to an interested party.
34. The doctrine of forum non conveniens is based on the theory
that defendant is subject to service of process in at least two forums.
See Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 800, 815 (1959). However, the property which




York, the plaintiff is not able to make a limited appearance,s5
the insured will be required to submit to personal jurisdiction
or lose his insurance through noncompliance with the cooperation
clause of his insurance contract. Thus, allowing quasi in rem
jurisdiction results in in personam jurisdiction over the insured.
However, in personam jurisdiction may not be unfair in the in-
stant case because of New York's substantial interest in the case
and the convenience of the forum. Also, since the insured
always assumes the risk of liability beyond his insurance cover-
age even if personal jurisdiction is not obtained, a multiplicity of
suits will be avoided.
It might be argued that quasi in rem jurisdiction should not
be expanded since personal jurisdiction is available where it is
reasonably fair to assert jurisdiction over defendant.36 Relevant
examples of expanded personal jurisdiction are the universally
adopted nonresident motorist statutes. 37 The theory behind
these statutes is that the situs of the accident is the most con-
venient and desirable place to determine merits of controver-
sies.38 Further examples are the direct action statutes which
permit the injured party to sue the insurer directly without first
establishing liability of the insured.3 9 These statutes are in-
tended to reduce the need for piecemeal litigation and to recog-
nize that insurance companies have the primary interest in liti-
gation.40
While personal jurisdiction has been greatly expanded, there
35. The trend today is to refuse limited appearance because per-
sonal rights and liabilities should not be subject to decisions of different
courts and multiplicity of litigation should be limited by determining all
issues in one proceeding. See generally Developments in the Law--State-
Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1960).
36. See Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdic-
tion, 76 HAnv. L. REV. 303 (1962).
37. See generally Gibbons, A Survey of the Modem Nonresident
Motorist Statutes, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 257 (1960). Personal jurisdiction
is obtained over the nonresident motorist in the state of the accident by
serving a state official. The nonresident motorist is presumed to have
consented to the appointment of this official as his agent by the act of
driving on the state highways.
38. Id. at 261. The insurer has usually established local contacts
which he can utilize in employing counsel to appear at trial, and most
of the documents used at trials, such as police reports and medical re-
cords, are located in the state of the accident.
39. See APu. STAT. ANx. § 66-3240 (Supp. 1959); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 22:655 (1959); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 27-7-2 (1956); Wis. STAT.
§§ 204.30(4), 260, II (I) (1959). See generally Note, Direct Action Stat-





still remain some situations where jurisdiction is justifiable but
cannot be obtained in personam. In the instant case, New York
was an appropriate forum and only quasi in rem jurisdiction
could be obtained.41 By allowing attachment of the obligation
to defend and indemnify, New York in effect permits suit against
the insurer before liability is established. Thus, New York has
used quasi in rem jurisdiction to reach a result similar to that
obtained through personal jurisdiction granted under direct ac-
tion statutes.
42
This use of quasi in rem, while a logical extension of prior
law, could produce undesirable results if not restricted to situa-
tions where the state serves as an appropriate forum. However,
it does not seem inconsistent with considerations of justice, con-
venience, and judicial efficiency to allow a plaintiff to sue an in-
surance company in his state of residence.
43
41. The argument has been made that a plaintiff should be per-
mitted to sue and obtain in personam jurisdiction at his residence. See
Ehrenzweig, Ehrenzweig in Reply, 9 J. PuB. L. 328 (1960).
42. Although New York does not have a direct action statute, it has
allowed such suits brought under a foreign statute, Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965).
It should be noted that achieving this result through direct action
statutes has inherent safeguards not present in quasi in rem jurisdiction.
For a direct action to be applicable at least one of the following must
be present: (1) the plaintiff is a resident of the state, (2) the accident
occurred in the state, or (3) the policy was issued in the state. See
generally Note, 74 HAnv. L. REv. 357 (1960). However, to obtain quasi
in rem jurisdiction under the theory used in Seider, the only require-
ment is that the insurance company be doing business in the forum.
43. If the accident occurs in the state, another factor would seem
to be added in favor of attachment. But see Morris v. Gould, Seventh
District of Minn. (1966) (pending appeal), which denied attachment of
insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify defendant in motorboat
accident despite the facts that plaintiff was a Minnesota resident, the
accident occurred in Minnesota, and the insurance company was author-
ized to do business in Minnesota.
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Taxation: Multiple Deductions Allowed Under
Literal Statutory Interpretation
Taxpayer borrowed money from a bank and purchased prem-
ium bonds' callable after thirty days, paying the premium out
of his own funds.2 After holding the bonds for thirty days, tax-
payer gave the bonds to a family charity3 subject to the bank
loan. The charity immediately 4 resold the bonds to the bank,
paid off the loan, and kept the premium. Taxpayer went
through the same routine four times in 1952 and again in 1953,
using the same bonds, bank, charit7, and broker in each trans-
action. In each case the taxpayer repurchased the bonds on the
same day that the charity sold them. He deducted the amount
of the bond premiums from his gross income both as an amor-
tizable bond premium and as a charitable contribution.5 The
Tax Court ruled that the taxpayer was entitled to the double de-
duction for just one of the transactions in each year, since the last
three in each year were shams.6 The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit reversed and held that the taxpayer was entitled
to deduct the amount of all four premiums both as amortizable
1. Premium bonds are purchased at a price higher than face value.
The premium may be paid in order to obtain a higher-than-market
interest rate, or for a variety of other reasons. See 1 DEWING, FnvA-
CIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 658-62 (5th ed. 1953). The premium is
the difference between the purchase price and the face or call value of
the bonds. See Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672, 677 (1962);
Commissioner v. Korell, 339 U.S. 619 (1950).
2. In 1952 the taxpayer borrowed $52,000 to finance each transac-
tion, contributing about $3,000 himself; in 1953 he borrowed $25,000 for
each transaction, again contributing about $3,000 himself. Brief for
Respondent, pp. 2-10.
3. The charity was the Stone Charitable Foundation, Inc. During
the years in question the president of the foundation was Stephen A.
Stone (taxpayer's nephew), the secretary was Abraham Stone (tax-
payer's brother), and the treasurer was Alfred P. Rudnick (attorney
for various members of the Stone family). Brief for Respondent, p. 3.
4. In 1952, the charity resold the bonds to the bank within a period
of days; in 1953, within hours. Brief for Respondent, p. 13.
5. The mechanics of the double deduction may be explained by
the following hypothetical: Taxpayer purchases a premium bond for
$53,000. The call value of the bond is $50,000. Taxpayer deducts $3,000
from his gross income as amortizable bond premium. When he gives
the bond to a charity subject to a $50,000 bank loan, he deducts a fur-
ther $3,000 from gross income as a charitable contribution. Therefore,
the taxpayer receives a $6,000 deduction from a $3,000 outlay. See
Fabreeka Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 876 (1st Cir. 1961).
6. Stone v. Commissioner, 24 CCE Tax Ct. Mem. 830, 834 (1965).
The Tax Court found that the four transactions were part of a pre-
arranged plan whose true economic nature was accurately reflected in
one amortization. Ibid.; Brief for Respondent, p. 13.
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bond premiums and as charitable contributions since each trans-
action had substance and met the literal requirements of the
applicable statute. Stone v. Commissioner, 360 F.2d 737 (1st Cir.
1966).
The courts have frequently asserted that in tax cases sub-
stance should prevail over form.7 This principle has been in-
voked in attacking almost every kind of tax avoidance plan.8
On the other hand, there is the frequently enunciated principle
that a taxpayer has the legal right to decrease the amount of
his taxes by any legal means9 and the fact that a transaction was
entered into with the intention of avoiding taxes is immaterial.10
Nevertheless, the courts have realistically refused to accept at
face value every technically correct device which the taxpayers'
ingenuity has developed in an effort to exploit loopholes in the
tax statutes. One of the most forceful arguments in favor of
closing such loopholes by means of the substance over form
principle is the prevention of the imitation of a successful tax
avoidance scheme." Therefore, the courts have repeatedly re-
served the right to scrutinize a transaction in order to determine
whether it is, in substance, a sham.12 Where a transaction is
found to be a sham, it may be ignored for tax purposes.18
The courts have used various approaches in determining
7. E.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). The tax-
payer arranged with an insurance company for a series of loans, using
an annuity which he had just purchased from the company as sole
security. The interest received by the taxpayer on the annuity was less
than the interest he paid on the loans, but the tax deduction on the
latter made the transactions profitable as a whole. In substance, the
taxpayer in Knetsch merely manufactured a tax saving in the form of
interest deductions by going through the motions of purchasing an an-
nuity and borrowing against it. The court looked behind the form of
the transactions and found that neither party intended that the loan
be repaid. Thus, the transactions were held to be a sham. See 2 BOSTON
COLLEGE IND. & Com. L. REV. 435 (1961). See also Wolf v. Commissioner,
357 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1966); Byerlite Corp. v. Williams, 286 F.2d 285 (6th
Cir. 1960).
8. See Peairs, General Principles of Taxation: An Initial Survey,
6 TAx L. Rzv. 471, 494-95 (1951).
9. See, e.g., Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954).
10. See, e.g., Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961);
Cravens v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1959).
11. See Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51
MIcH. L. REV. 1021 (1953).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Bondurant, 245 F.2d 265 (6th Cir.
1957); Williams v. United States, 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955).
13. See, e.g., Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481 (1937);
Bowers v. Lawyers Mort. Co., 285 U.S. 182 (1932); Particelli v. Commis-
sioner, 212 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1954).
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whether a technically valid tax maneuver is really a sham which
should be disregarded.14 Several courts, for example, have em-
phasized the requirement that the challenged transaction be
within the underlying purpose of the applicable statute.15 The
appearance of being within the purview of statute is insuffi-
cient.16 Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
emphasized the particular "economic realities" rather than "legal
abstractions.' 7 Thus, there must be at least the possibility that
the taxpayer's financial interest will be affected other than by
tax deductions,' 8 and the component parts of the plan must be
considered together. 9
However, technically correct transactions have not always
been subjected to the close scrutiny which the above principles
would seem to suggest.20 The courts have hesitated to disregard
technical adherence to statutory requirements for fear that such
action would have unfortunate ramifications in subsequent
cases.2 ' This hesitancy has been especially apparent in cases
arising under section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
before its amendment in 1958.22 This statute,23 enacted to deal
14. See generally Rice, supra note 11.
15. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Com-
missioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
16. Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
17. Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961). The
court goes on to say that "the reach of -he income tax law is not to be
delimited by technical refinements or mere formalism." Ibid. For the
principle that income tax law is a practical matter see Commissioner v.
Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 303 (1956); International Trading
Co. v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1960).
18. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Bridges v. Com-
missioner, 325 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963). See generally Guterman, Sub-
stance v. Form in the Taxation of Personal and Business Transactions,
N.Y.U. 20TH IxST. oN FED. TAX 951 (1962).
19. Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954).
20. Rice, supra note 11.
21. See, e.g., Eaton v. White, 70 F.2d 449, 452 (1st Cir. 1934).
22. See, e.g., Halle v. United States, 346 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1965);
Fabreeka Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 876 (1st Cir. 1961).
23. IxT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 125, added by Revenue Act of 1942,
ch. 619, 56 Stat. 798, § 126 (now INT. REr. CoDE OF 1954, § 171).
AmORTIZABLE BOND PREmium.
(a) General Rule.-In the case of any bond, as defined in sub-
section (d) the following rules shall apply to the amortizable
bond premium (determined under subsection (b)) on the bond
for any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1941:(1) Interest wholly or partially taxable.-In the case of a bond(other than a bond the interest on which is excludible from
gross income), the amount of the amortizable bond premium
for the taxable year shall be allowed as a deduction.
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equitably with the peculiar financial nature of premium bonds, 24
allows a deduction to compensate the bondholder for the risk of
an early call at face value,25 and reflects the return of capital
nature of the interest paid on such bonds.26 However, taxpayers
soon discovered that the statute afforded an unintended op-
portunity for tax savings. For example, in Fabreeka Prods. Co.
v. Commissioner,27 the taxpayer employed essentially the same
machinations found in Stone, but did so only once. There, the
government argued that the statute was designed to allow deduc-
tions only for investment purchases, but the court held that the
taxpayer had brought himself within the literal requirements of
the statute and was entitled to the deduction.28
In the instant case, the government conceded that the tax-
payer was entitled to a double deduction for each transaction in-
volving the purchase of premium bonds and their subsequent
gift to charity.29 However, the government contended the tax-
payer had really entered into only one transaction in each year
and had tried to make it look like four.30
(b) Amortizable bond premium.
(1) Amount of bond premium.-For the purposes of para-
graph (2), the amount of bond premium, in the case of the
holder of any bond, shall be determined with reference to the
amount of the basis (for determining loss on sale or exchange)
of such bond, and with reference to the amount payable on ma-
turity or on earlier call date, with adjustment proper to reflect
unamortized bond premium with respect to the bond, for the
period prior to the date as of which subsection (a) becomes ap-
plicable with respect to the taxpayer with respect to such bond.
In 1958 Congress eliminated the right to amortize to call date by
requiring amortization to be spread over the period to maturity. INT.
R V. CODE OF 1954, § 171(2).
24. See S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1950).
25. See H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1954). The
bondholder was allowed to amortize the full premium to the earliest call
date to compensate for the risk of an early call of the bonds. See note
6 supra.
26. The premium was often paid to obtain a: higher-than-market
interest rate, but the interest was paid on the face value of the bond,
and was taxed as ordinary income. The deduction was intended to com-
pensate for the fact that the interest earned on premium bonds was in
part a return of capital. See Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S.
672 (1962); Commissioner v. Korell, 339 U.S. 619 (1950).
27. 294 F.2d 876 (1st Cir. 1961).
28. Id. at 878. Several other cases have upheld the deductibility
of premiums where tax avoidance was the sole consideration. E.g., Halle
v. United States, 346 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1965); Evans v. Dudley, 295 F.2d
713 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 909 (1962); Maysteel Prods., Inc.
v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1961).
29. Brief for Respondent, pp. 11-12.
30. Id. at 12. The government's argument was similar to the posi-
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Since the recipient of the bonds was a family foundation,3 1
the government contended that the change m ownership was es-
pecially suspect The government implicitly drew upon the
principle that where parties to a transaction are relatives, the
transaction is not necessarily a sham,32 but such transactions are
carefully scrutinized to see if actual control passed with the legal
title.3 3 Here the four transactions were clearly part of a pre-
arranged plan, and the petitioner could be confident of the co-
operation of the foundation. In effect, it was argued that the
taxpayer never relinquished control, and hence ownership, of
the bonds.
The government bolstered this argument with the point that
there was not a sufficient interval between the disposition and
reacquisition of the bonds to constitute separate transactions. 34
The brief period of time for which the taxpayer relinquished
technical ownership, coupled with the fact that the same bonds
were immediately repurchased, resulted in one actual risk to be
sustained by the taxpayer, and that one risk was adequately re-
flected by one deduction. 35 Finally the government stressed the
fact that the taxpayer's last three maneuvers had no relationship
to the original purposes of the statute. The government's argu-
ments were closely related to one another and culminated in the
assertion that the last three transactions in each year were with-
out economic substance.
tion taken by the Tax Court in its ruling on the case. See Stone v.
Commissioner, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 834 (1965)
31. The relevant point is that the charity cooperated with the tax-
payer in the procurement of a series of tax deductions in return for a
series of contributions. The fact that this was a family charity lends
support to the government's contention that the charity was merely a
receptacle for bare legal title and that the last three transactions in each
year were illusory. See Brief for Respondent, p. 18.
32. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1936),
where a husband gave funds to his wife, then borrowed them back and
deducted the interest she charged. The-.court allowed the deduction,
noting that the wife might have .collected the note.
33. See Boyce v. United States, 190 F.Supp. 950 (W.D. La. 1961),
aff'd per curam, 296 F.2d-731 (5th Cir. 1961), David L. Lieb, 40 T.C. 161
(1963). In the Lzeb case, the husband purchased premium bonds, sold
them to his wife, repurchased them, and claimed a deduction on both
purchases. The Tax Court disallowed the second deduction. See also
Shaw Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1963), where
the court ignored a corporation set up solely for tax purposes, noting
that "bare legal title and real ownership are not necessarily synony-
mous." Id. at 320.
34. Brief for Respondent, p. 13.
35. The risk of call in the last three transactions was the same risk
for which the taxpayer had been given the first deduction since the
[Vol. 51:166
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The court, in rejecting the government's argument, con-
cluded that the taxpayer had valid reasons for entering into four
separate transactions.3 6 The court was persuaded that the
separate transactions significantly minimized taxpayer's risk in
the event that the bonds were called and allowed him to make a
sizable investment which lack of funds would otherwise have
made more difficult.37 Beyond this the court was remarkably
cursory in its reasoning. It declared itself unpersuaded by the
government's arguments, cited a few cases noting the folly of
judicially legislating away a loophole in the tax law,33 and, sig-
nificantly noted that Stone had been frolicking in a "short-lived
playing ground."3 9 Since the court felt that the danger of imi-
tation was not present, it was apparently unwilling to change the
rules retrospectively 40 on a contestant who had been "shrewd"
and "well advised." 41 Further, the taxpayer had complied with
the literal requirements of the statute and that procedure had
been sufficient in prior cases.2
The court in Stone was admittedly faced with a difficult
problem. Clearly each transaction met the literal requirements
of section 125 and there had been a technical sale and repurchase
of the bonds in each cycle. Nevertheless, in view of the repetitive
nature of the taxpayer's transactions43 the instant case is unde-
niably an extremely liberal application of the principle that literal
compliance with a tax statute is the essential factor in such
cases, and a retreat from the often articulated principle that sub-
stance should prevail over form.
same bonds were repurchased and since there was only a one day inter-
val in the taxpayer's ownership of the bonds. One of the cases relied
upon by the court noted the importance that the risk sustained- by the
taxpayer has in assessing ownership. See Maysteel Prods., Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 287 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1961).
36. 360 F.2d at 740.
37. Ibid.
38. See, e.g., Halle v. United States, 346 F.2d 543, 551 (4th Cir.
1965); cf. United States v. Rhode Island Hosp.-Trust Co., 355 F.2d-.7-(lst
Cir. 1966).
39. 360 F.2d at 740.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Id. at 739-40.
43. The mere repetitiveness of the transactions did not stamp the
scheme as a sham, especially after similar single transactions had been
upheld in Fabreeka and Halle; however, the artificial appearance of the
plan when viewed as a whole might well have spurred the court to a
closer look at the changes in ownership and control. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.171-2(a) (3) where the Commissioner declares his intention to scru-
tinize immediate purchases and transfers of premium bonds.
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A careful analysis of the situation in the instant case reveals
that the last three transactions in each year had no possibility of
affecting the taxpayer's financial position other than by way of
a tax deduction, since the same bonds were repurchased almost
immediately after being given to the charity and resold to the
bank.44  Moreover, the transactions were entered into by the
taxpayer and an entity which could reasonably be found to be
under his control. Finally, the four transactions were planned in
advance in an effort to gain four tax deductions out of one con-
tinuous $50,000 investment.45 In view of the above, it would
have been quite possible, indeed more logical, for the court to
have disregarded the last three transactions of each year.46 Had
the taxpayer used different charities and different bonds in each
transaction, the court's holding would be more defensible since
the taxpayer would have incurred a different risk of early recall
of the bonds, or would not have been able to control the charity's
subsequent dealings with the bonds. Further, the court did not
need to "legislate" in order to invalidate the last three transac-
tions in each year; it had only to look behind their form and find
them to be shams. That the court chose not to do so may be
traced to the fact that Congress had put an end to such ma-
neuvers in 1958.
It is true that Congress had closed this particular loophole,
and the court may have felt that it was not setting a dangerous
precedent for related areas of tax law since, especially in tax
cases, "each case turns upon the particular facts involved."47
However, since Stone may be cited as precedent for upholding
the validity of illusory transactions, the court has added to the
government's burden in combatting subsequent sham tax trans-
actions.
44. The court seemed to attach some significance to the taxpayer's
assertions that the four transactions were motivated by a desire to min-
imize the risk and to avoid the need for arranging for large amounts at
one time. 360 F.2d at 740. Other courts have been more discerning
when viewing a taxpayer's purported "reasons" for his operations. See,
e.g., Shaw Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1963);
Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
45. Otherwise, if the taxpayer could arrange the financing, it would
have been simple enough to arrange one $200,000 purchase.
46. See Boyce v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. La. 1961),
aff]d per curiam, 296 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1961).
47. Nassau Lens Co. v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1962).
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Trade Regulation: Section 5 of FTCA Requires No
Demonstration of Anti-Competitive Possibilities
in Exclusive Dealing Agreements
Petitioner, the second largest shoe manufacturer in the
United States,' had entered into franchising agreements with its
customers 2 requiring the customer to concentrate its "business
within the grades and price lines of shoes representing Brown
Shoe Company ... and ... have no lines conflicting with Brown
Division Brands of the Brown Shoe Company."13 Retailers par-
ticipating in this franchise program received valuable benefits
and services4 without cost. The Federal Trade Commission, find-
ing that such agreements violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act5 as "unfair methods of competition," ordered
petitioner to cease and desist from this practice.6 The Eighth
Circuit dismissed the order after finding that there was no tying
agreement and no illegal exclusive dealing agreement.7 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the program conflicted
with the underlying policy of the Sherman and Clayton Acts and
was thus an "unfair method of competition" within the meaning
of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, even though
the FTC did not prove that the effect of the exclusive dealing
agreement "may be to substantially lessen competition." FTC
v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
1. Brown, as of 1959, was the third largest manufacturer of shoes
by pairage. However, they were second in dollar volume of business.
Brown Shoe Co., 9 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (Complaints, Orders, Stipula-
tions) 16316, at 21145 (1963).
2. Brown marketed its shoes through mail order houses and a sub-
stantial number of company owned retail shoe stores. They also dis-
tributed shoes through approximately 6,000 independent retail shoe stores
of which only 700 participated in the franchising program. Brief for
Petitioner, p. 4.
3. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 318 (1966).
4. The services included: merchandising records and advice, serv-
ices of a field representative, the right to participate in group insurance
plans, retail sales training programs, an expensive accounting system,
signs and business forms, and special prices on canvas and rubber foot-
wear. Brown Shoe Co., 9 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations) 1 16316, at 21135 (1963).
5. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1964). "Unfair
methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." 38 Stat. 719
(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964).
6. Brown Shoe Co., 9 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations) 15705, at 20534; 16316, at 21135 (1963).
7. Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1964), 22 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 208 (1965).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Although exclusive dealing arrangementss may violate both
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,9 Section 3 of the Clayton
Act makes explicit reference to exclusive dealing ° and has been
the primary tool for preventing such practices." A section 3
violation is shown only if the effect of the conduct in question
"may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce."'12 Since the Clayton Act
was intended to supplement the Sherman Act, the standards of
illegality 13 are generally less rigorous than those applied in
Sherman Act cases. Nevertheless, specifying the degree of les-
sened competition which must be shown to establish a violation
has caused much difficulty.
Prior to 1949, the courts applied a detailed ad hoc economic
analysis to determine whether the conduct in question constituted
a substantial competitive deterrent. t 4 In that year, the quanti-
8. Exclusive dealing may be defined as the situation in which
goods, commodities or services are sold or leased on the condition that
the purchaser or lessee will not handle products of a competing supplier.
9. Section 1 provides: "Every contract, combination ... or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade . . .is hereby declared to be illegal.. .."
Section 2 provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize.., shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ...." 26 Stat.
209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
10. That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce ... to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods
... or other commodities . . . or fix a price charged therefor,
or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition,
agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof
shall not use or deal in the goods . . . or other commodities of
a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the
effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition,
agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
11. ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANmUST REP. 138-49 (1955); Lock-
hart & Sacks, Relevence of Economic Fhctors in Determining Whether
Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARV.
L. REv. 913 (1952).
12. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
13. "Standards of illegality" are conditions which must be proven
in order to find a violation. As used in this comment, the term applies
primarily to the question of the degree of competitive effect which must
be demonstrated and whether or not there is economic justification for
the particular act; it does not pertain to a consideration of whether the
conduct in question is technically within the wording of the statute.
14. See FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 .(1923); FTC v. Cur-
tis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923); Bok, The Tampa Electric Case
and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements under the Clayton Act, 1961
Sup. CT. REV. 267, 273-74; Howrey, Utilization by the FTC of Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act as an Antitrust Law, 5 ANTnmUST
BULL. 161, 178-79 (1960).
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tative substantiality' 5 rule was introduced which simply re-
quired a showing that competition was foreclosed in a substantial
share of the market.16 No consideration was given to economic
justification for the practice. However, this trend toward a
lesser burden of proof was reversed by Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nash-
ville Coal Co.'7 The Court held that application of the competi-
tive standard required a consideration of the relative bargaining
strengths of the parties, the proportionate volume of commerce
involved in relation to the total volume of commerce in the
relevant market, and the probable immediate and future effects
which pre-emption of that share of the market might have on
effective competition therein. Tampa Electric rejected the sug-
gestion that the standard of illegality established by Standard
Stations required only a showing that the exclusive dealing ar-
rangement involved a substantial number of dollars. 18 While
the "standards of illegality" are still ambiguous, the most plaus-
ible interpretation of the Court's requirements is that a higher
standard of illegality must be met.19
It is well established that acts and practices which violate the
specific terms of the Sherman or Clayton Acts are within the
meaning of "unfair methods of competition" of Section 5 of the
15. Quantitative substantiality may be distinguished from qualita-
tive substantiality primarily by means of an examination of the type of
proof required to meet the standards of illegality. -Quantitative requires
only a demonstration that comp &tition has been foieclosed in a substan-
tial share of the relevant market area affected.' Qualitative would re-
quire a more extended economic analysis and would consider economic
justification or necessity a defense. See Lockhart & Sacks, supra note
11, at 923-928 for a list of possible economic considerations.
16. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); Lockhart
& Sacks, supra note 11, at 916-17; Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act with the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, 59 McH. L. Rav. 821, 829-30 (1961). "The rule of Standard
Stations is, then: when competitors are foreclosed from a substantial
enough share of the market, it is not far-fetched to infer substantial
lessening of competition." Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract and
Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 28 (1959).
17. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
18. The court noticeably avoids the statement that demonstration
of mere market percentage is not enough. Furthermore; inasmuch as the
economic considerations, e.g., the fact that Tampa was a public utility
and the purchasers in Standard Stations were retail outlets and that
Tampa was interested in the agreement whereas there may have been
an element of coercion in Standard Stations, were quite diverse, it is
doubtful that Tampa overrules Standard Stations. However, it may be
argued that a substantial percentage of the market would be intrinsically
unreasonable to the point that it would create a per se illegality if it
exceeded the Standard Stations amounts.
19. See, e.g., Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964);
Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
1966]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
FTCA.20  It has also been held that certain acts and practices
similar to those prohibited by other antitrust legislation are
within the scope of section 5 even though the conduct is beyond
the specific provisions of those acts.2: In so finding, the standards
of illegality of the act whose provisions the behavior approxi-
mates have been applied.22 Finally, incipient Sherman Act viola-
tions, those where the anti-competitive effect does not presently
violate Sherman Act standards, are also within the scope of
section 5.23
Dicta has appeared in several decisions of the Court sug-
gesting that section 5 may also include incipient Clayton Act
violations. Fashion Originators', Inc. v. FTC2 4 outlawed under
section 5 a group boycott organized within the garment in-
dustry against retailers who sold garments copied from designs
created by Guild members. Although the boycott was well
within the prohibitive policy of Sherman 25 and met the com-
petitive standard established under that act,26 the Court also
discussed the application of Clayton Act policies to the facts
presented, concluding that the Commission has the power to
20. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948), ended any possible
argument that § 5 could not be applied to matters directly covered
by the Sherman Act. See FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441
(1922). Use of § 5 in matters directly covered by the Clayton Act
also seems well established. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609 (1953) ; FTC v. Motion Pictures Advertis-
ing Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953); Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc.
v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). See generally Howrey, supra note 14; Rahl,
Does Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act Extend the Clayton
Act? 5 A=NTTRUST BuLL. 533 (1960).
21. See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); ATToRNEY
GENERAL's CommrRE, op. cit. supra note 12, at 148-49 n.78 (1955); How-
rey, supra note 14, at 174; Oppenheim, supra note 16, at 835-36.
22. See Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962); Fore-
most Dairies Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1480 (1956); Carnation Co., 9 CCH TRADE REG.
REP. (Complaints, Orders, Stipulations) 'g 15911, at 20728 (1962).
1 23. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 708 (1948); FTC
v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 152 (1942); Oppenheim, supra note 16, at
826.
24. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
25. See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United
States, 234 U.S. 600, 609-11 (1914); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States, 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Comment,
58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1136-40 (1949).
26. The practices of the Fashion Originators' Guild were of the
type designated per se illegalities. See Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, supra note 25; Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co. v. United States, supra note 25. To meet the tests of per se illegality
the conduct itself need only be demonstrated to constitute a transgres-
sion of the law. FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52,
62 (1927). See also cases cited in note 34 infra.
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suppress practices in which the defendant's "purpose and practice
... runs counter to the public policy declared in the Sherman
and Clayton Acts. '2 7
In FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co.,28 the FTC
prohibited, under section 5, a distributor of advertising films
from securing exclusive exhibition rights in a large number of
motion picture theaters for more than one year.2 9 Citing Fashion
Originators', the Court made the broad and ambiguous statement:
"It is also clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was de-
signed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act . . . to stop in their incipiency acts and practices
which, when full blown, would violate those Acts."30 However,
it has been argued that the discussion of incipient Clayton viola-
tions was inapplicable because the exclusive screening arrange-
ments fell technically outside the provisions of the Clayton Act.
3 1
In a later case, Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, -3 2 the Court stated
that "all that is necessary in Section 5 proceedings to find a
violation is to discover conduct that 'runs counter to the public
policy declared in the' Act." Since the conduct in this case was
similar to a tying arrangement,33 which is a violation of both
the Sherman and Clayton Acts,34 such language could be in-
27. 312 U.S. 457, 463 (1941).
28. 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
29. It is interesting to note that the Court did not say that all
screening agreements were illegal. After taking the business conditions
into consideration, the Court decided that all agreements which lasted
for more than one year were illegal. It appears that this result would
lend a great deal of support to the argument that economic justification
is a defense to exclusive dealing activities. The majority did not cite the
holding of Standard Stations that economic justification may not be con-
sidered.
30. 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953).
31. Rahl, supra note 20, at 541. The item sold or leased was only
screening time and thus might not be a "commodity" within the language
of Clayton.
32. 381 U.S. 357 (1965), 50 M=x. L. REv. 765 (1966).
33. A tying agreement exists when the seller conditions the sale of
the tying product, a unique item which is usually either patented or
copyrighted, on the buyer's corresponding purchase of a nonunique item,
the tied product. Thus the seller coerces the purchaser into acceptance
of the tied product. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957).
34. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (block booking
of motion pictures to television stations); Northern Pacific Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (railroad contracts tied to the sale of
land); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953) (advertisers required to buy equal time in morning and evening
paper); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (sale
of salt tied to dispenser); See also Weisbard, Resale Price Maintenance,
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terpreted as referring to an incipient Clayton Act violation.
However, the Court clearly emphasized that the conduct before
it was not a technical violation of the Clayton Act but only
similar to one. Furthermore, the Court stated that it was apply-
ing the same competitive standards that would have been applied
if the action could have been brought within the provisions of the
Clayton Act.
Thus the case law prior to Brown Shoe expanded section 5
only to include actual violations of other antitrust legislation,
conduct resembling that proscribed by the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, and conduct which may lead to a Sherman Act violation.
Since none of the cases defining the scope of section 5 required a
lessening of the competitive standards of the Clayton Act, it may
be argued that all references to incipient Clayton Act violations
were intended to mean only behaviorally incipient violations,
practices behaviorally similar to Clayton Act violations but tech-
nically beyond its scope.
In holding that an exclusive dealing arrangement may be
found unlawful under section 5 even though the competitive
effects of such arrangement do not satisfy the standards of ille-
gality established under section 3, the Court has gone beyond its
prior decisions to authorize a test of competitive incipiency.
While section 5 was designed to stop potential violations of the
antitrust laws in their incipiency, the application of a competitive
incipiency test to exclusive dealing arrangements may be con-
trary to congressional intent. In contrast to the general language
of most antitrust legislation, Section 3 of the Clayton Act specif-
ically declares exclusive dealing arrangements to be unlawful.
Therefore, it may be argued that the general statement of the
Federal Trade Commission Act was not intended to reduce the
specific requirements of Clayton.35  Furthermore, the Clayton
Act was enacted after the Federal Trade Commission Act,3 0 ne-
Exclusive Dealing and Tying Arrangements, 10 ANTrTRuST BULL. 341, 372
(1965).
35. One of the fundamental canons of statutory construction is that,
whenever two provisions within the same statute or two contemporane-
ous statutes appear to conflict, the specific shall take precedence over
the general. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5204 (3d ed. 1943).
See also, Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons about how Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REv. 395, 401-06 (1950).
36. The Federal Trade Commission Act became law on September
26, 1914, and the Clayton Act became law on October 15, 1914. See But-
ler, Federal Trade Commission Jurisdiction under the Incipiency Doc-
trine, U. MICH. SUMMMR INST. ON INT'L & ComP. LAw, FED. ANTTRUST
LAws, 154, 164-71 (1953).
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gating any possibility that FTCA could have been intended to
amend Clayton.37
However, the consequence of a finding of illegality under the
Clayton Act differs substantially from a condemnation of the
same conduct under section 5. No private party can bring suit
under section 5, and the remedy available to the Federal Trade
Commission is limited to cease and desist orders.38 If the con-
duct is violative of the Clayton Act, however, the offending party
may be subject to criminal prosecution and civil treble damage
suits in addition to government actions designed only to stop the
illegal conduct.3 9 Thus, while Congress clearly intended that the
severe remedies available under the Clayton Act be limited to
cases in which the conduct "may substantially lessen competi-
tion," the existence of the Clayton Act would not seem to show
a statutory intent that exclusive dealing arrangements having a
lesser competitive effect not be subject to the less severe liabilities
flowing from section 5.
It may be argued that the standards of illegality established
under the Clayton Act are sufficiently inclusive to reach any
exclusive dealing arrangement potentially injurious to competi-
tion. Therefore, a test of competitive incipiency would serve only
to condemn practices in no way contrary to the public interest.
However, such a position is difficult to document. Available
economic data does not foreclose the possibility that certain con-
duct, competitively incipient to the Clayton Act, may adversely
affect competition to the injury of the public. The Federal Trade
Commission, as an expert body designed to evaluate complex and
difficult economic considerations, is best able to make such de-
terminations. Thus Brown Shoe, by refusing to withdraw con-
duct of this type from the power of the FTC, has taken a necessary
step toward a fully effective system for the policing of anti-
competitive practices.
Nevertheless, much confusion is likely to result from the
failure of the Brown Shoe opinion to set forth guidelines to be
followed in cases involving competitively incipient Clayton Act
37. The Clayton Act was itself intended to stop Sherman Act viola-
tions in their incipiency. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647 (1931);
Oppenheim, supra note 16, at 823-24. Thus any attempt to include in-
cipient Clayton Act violations within § 5 causes what authorities have
termed "incipient-incipiency" or "incipiency squared." Butler, supra
note 36, at 164-71; Howrey, supra note 14, at 173; Rahl, supra note 20,
at 541.
38. See 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
39. See 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
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violations. Although the purpose of the holding can be accom-
plished only if the Commission is given broad discretion in such
cases, some definition of the considerations to be weighed would
seem appropriate and necessary. If a practice can be found to be
an unfair method of competition upon no showing of injury to
competition, section 5 will be extended far beyond the intended
scope of the antitrust laws. The opinion of the FTC in Brown
Shoe apparently applied a standard based on market position and
structure rather than market percentages and relative bargaining
position. The Commission found an increasing degree of vertical
integration among the leading shoe manufacturers which had
operated to substantially weaken the ability of the smaller man-
ufacturers to compete effectively.40 The exclusive dealing ar-
rangements of Brown and other leaders in the industry were
found to complement the trend toward vertical integration and
further reduce industry competition.41 Consequently, prohibition
of the Brown franchise program was found necessary "to foster
the competitive position of the smaller manufacturers.1 42 The
Court's repeated reference to Brown as the country's second
largest manufacturer of shoes suggests approval of this line of
reasoning.
However, such analysis would not seem to encompass all com-
petitively incipient Clayton Act violations which are injurious to
the public interest. Cases demanding application of section 5
may arise in which the structure of the market and the respond-
ent's position in the market are not relevant competitive con-
siderations. Approval of the FTC rationale in Brown Shoe does
suggest, however, that all economic considerations bearing upon
the competitive effects of the specific conduct in question must
be considered and evaluated.
It is submitted that economic justification should also be
considered in determining the legality of competitively incipient
Clayton Act violations. Brown Shoe involved an exclusive deal-
ing arrangement for which there appears no legitimate business
justification. The arrangement did not guarantee the retailer a
constant source of supply. It was not necessary to make Brown
an effective competitor in the industry. The only benefits to the
retailer were the collateral incentives offered by Brown exclu-
sively to participants in the program. Brown was advantaged
40. Brown Shoe Co., 9 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (Complaints, Orders,
Stipulations) 11 16316, at 21146 (1963).
41. Ibid.
42. Id. at 21146-47.
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only by the restraint on competition. There is no reason why
such an arrangement should not be found unlawful on a showing
of a modicum of anti-competitive potentiality.
Other exclusive dealing arrangements may be justified by
legitimate business considerations. For example, such arrange-
ments may substantially aid a newcomer to become an effective
competitor in its industry. Also, a purchaser may risk serious
losses of business unless continuity is assured by a guaranteed
source of supply If a legitimate economic justification is shown,
the offending conduct should be prohibited only if the injury to
competition, potential or present, is found to outweigh the legiti-
mate interests of the parties and the public served by continuance
of the practice. Since the competitive incipiency test was es-
tablished only to reach conduct which does not satisfy the "sub-
stantially lessen competition" test of the Clayton Act, the public
interest furthered by prohibition of such conduct would not seem
sufficient to require that substantial mconvenience or loss be
imposed upon the defendant.
In conclusion, while Brown Shoe has taken a desirable and
necessary step by extending section 5 to reach competitively
incipient Clayton Act violations, the decision leaves unanswered
many questions crucial to the application of this new and sig-
nificant development.
19661
